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Using HIV/AIDS, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and avian
influenza as case studies, this paper discusses the processes and dilemmas of
China’s participation in health governance, both at the domestic level and the
global level. Globalization has eroded the boundary between public and private
health and between domestic and global health governance. In addition, the
SARS outbreak of 20022003 focused global attention on China’s public health.
As a rising power with the largest population on earth, China is expected by the
international community to play a better and more active role in health
management. Since the turn of this century, China has increasingly embraced
multilateralism in health governance. This paper argues that China’s multilateral
cooperation is driven by both necessity and conscious design. International
concerns about good governance and its aspiration to become a ‘responsible’ state
have exerted a normative effect on China to change tack. Its interactions with
United Nations agencies have triggered a learning process for China to securitize
the spread of infectious diseases as a security threat. Conversely, China has
utilized multilateralism to gain access to international resources and technical
assistance. It is still a matter of debate whether China’s cooperative engagement
with global health governance can endure, because of the persistent problems of
withholding information on disease outbreaks and because of its insistence on the
Westphalian notion of sovereignty.
Keywords: China; infectious diseases; global health governance; WHO;
sovereignty
Introduction
In the past quarter century, China’s economic reforms have brought opportunities
and prosperity to many Chinese citizens. As a consequence of the adoption of the
reform and opening-up policy, urbanization has grown and trade and travel
between China and the rest of the world have expanded. A potential danger of
China’s increasing connections with the world, and the concomitant rising mobility
of its people, is the acceleration of the global spread of infectious diseases. Another
unfortunate development is that, in sharp contrast to the stunning success of
economic reforms, China’s public health reforms have left the country with a
backward public health system. With Deng Xiaoping’s dictum, ‘to get rich is
glorious’, the government acted single-mindedly in economic pursuit, to the
detriment of social infrastructural development. Anything which was thought
likely to increase production cost, and consequently to undermine economic
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development, was deemed undesirable and unacceptable. With this kind of
philosophy, public health was given only a relatively low priority in the
government’s national development plan. As a consequence, people’s rights to
basic health services are no longer guaranteed. Poor people are less likely to get
access to medical services or the modern healthcare system. In a world health
report entitled ‘Health Systems: Improving Performance’, published by the World
Health Organization (WHO) in 2000, China’s healthcare system was ranked 188th
on the dimension of fairness of financial contribution.1
Apart from being unfair, the operation of the health system has been opaque.
Due to market-related concerns, government officials are worried about the negative
impact of the revelations of any outbreak of disease inside China. The outbreak of
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 20022003 was a wake-up call for
China, as well as the international community, on the importance and seriousness of
China’s approach to health governance. China, a rising power with the largest
population on earth, is expected by the international community to play a better and
more active role in health management.
Since the turn of the century, China has increasingly embraced multilateralism in
global health governance. This engagement has deepened since the SARS outbreak.
This paper examines the processes and dilemmas of China’s engagement in global
health regimes. First, it provides some background information about globalization
and public health. It then focuses on China’s public health by examining the extent
to which China deals with health issues through multilateral cooperation. The paper
then discusses the processes and dilemmas of China’s participation in health
governance at the domestic as well as the global level, using three cases involving
HIV/AIDS, SARS, and avian influenza (known also as ‘bird flu’, ‘H5N1’, and ‘avian
flu’). Based on the empirical examination of these cases, the paper attempts to
theorize China’s participation in global health governance before drawing some
conclusions.
Globalization and public health
Microorganisms do not recognize or respect national boundaries, especially in a
highly globalizing world. Infectious diseases can readily spread from one country to
another and, indeed, from one continent to another, posing direct threats to national
and human security, as evidenced by the spread of such contagious diseases as HIV/
AIDS, SARS, and avian flu. Many new and resurgent pathogenic viruses have the
capacity to reach anywhere in the world within 24 hours. They can have a destructive
effect on state capacity, national prosperity, and effective governance. Public health
can no longer be perceived as a domestic issue, separated from foreign-policy
concerns. It is now widely considered a non-traditional security threat with a global
dimension. Lincoln C. Chen and his colleagues argue that globalization is eroding
the boundary between the determinants of public and private health (Chen et al.
1999). The late Jonathan Mann, former head of the WHO Global Programme on
AIDS, said that ‘the dramatic increases in worldwide movement of people, goods,
and ideas is the driving force behind the globalization of disease . . . health problems
in any part of the world can rapidly become a health threat to many or all’ (quoted in
Garrett 1994: xixii). It is little wonder that the fight against infectious diseases































constituted one of the priority areas of the Group of Eight summit meeting held in
St. Petersburg, Russia, in July 2006.
In the present globalized world, no single state has the ability to contain and
control a highly lethal infectious disease on its own. A country’s public health and its
policies could have dire consequences for itself as well as the international
community. Public health governance or international health governance has
primarily been focused on the national level. Under the Westphalian concept of
governance, the state has supreme power over its internal affairs. According to the
principle of consent-based international law, states have no legal obligation to
involve international institutions in addressing a health crisis within its territory.
Cooperation and compliance with the International Health Regulations of WHO
depend very much on the goodwill of governments. In this respect, the international
community has little or no legal basis to condemn China for its denial of entry of a
WHO delegation at the early stages of the SARS outbreak (Fidler 2004).2
Given the deterritorialization nature of globalization, the issue is how to manage
borderless microorganisms in a borderless world. Health issues are at the forefront in
the study of global politics in the twenty-first century.3 Some International Relations
scholars have called for a post-Westphalian form of governance in managing
pathogenic diseases (Fidler 2004, So and Ngai 2004). They are sceptical about the
usefulness of the state-centric, Westphalian approach to public health. For instance,
in his study of the SARS outbreak, David Fidler (2004) concludes that ‘Westphalian
public health’ principles failed to combat the outbreak. Public health should no
longer be considered as a medical and social issue alone, but also as a security issue
that needs a more effective mechanism to address it. In order to manage health issues
more effectively in a globalizing world, health governance requires a fundamental
transformation of the understanding of national sovereignty. As Richard Dodgson
and Kelley Lee (2002: 99) have argued, there is a need to ‘deterritorialize health . . .
by going beyond the primary focus on the state’.
This post-Westphalian global health governance seeks to promote human health
by the provision of global public goods for health. Strictly speaking, health per se is
not a public good, but the prevention or containment of infectious diseases is non-
rivalrous (i.e. letting nonpayers enjoy the benefits creates no cost to the payers) and
non-excludable (i.e. it is difficult to exclude nonpayers from the benefits). With these
distinctive characteristics, the prevention and containment of infectious diseases can
be considered a global public good (Zacher 1999, Woodward and Smith 2003).
Conversely, any belated response or negligence in the prevention and containment of
infectious diseases can be deemed to be a global public bad.
Global health governance is premised on the taking of collective actions, by a
range of actors, with the aim of tackling health problems, and of promoting and
protecting the health of populations through the making and implementation of
global norms and rules. It needs to ‘recognize and give meaningful participation of a
greater plurality of interests to capture both the territorial and supraterritorial
features of global health issues’ (Dodgson and Lee 2002: 100). The state should not
be the only actor, but rather part of a wider system that involves non-state actors,
including international and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), corpora-
tions, private foundations, and individual activists. Infectious diseases can only be
contained and defeated by state and non-state actors cooperating with each other
and responding promptly and decisively. At issue is whether and how states deal with































health issues through multilateral cooperation and participation in global health
governance.
Why China’s public health?
There are four reasons for investigating China’s public health: (a) the escalating
tension between China’s traditional Westphalian concept of world order and the
demand for a post-Westphalian health governance; (b) a general neglect of China’s
health governance in the discipline of International Relations; (c) international
scepticism of the true situation of China’s public health; and (d) China’s ailing
healthcare system.
China’s traditional state-centrism
Traditionally, China has perceived public health as a domestic social issue, and has
played down its international implications. Its response to the SARS outbreak, in
early 2003, resonated well with the Westphalian concept of handling public health
issues. Although China has stepped up its integration with the rest of the world over
the last two decades, it still steadfastly resists any international intervention in its
internal affairs. While China has modified its approach to health governance, and
increased rapidly its participation in global health regimes since the SARS outbreak,
its health governance, both domestic and global, has remained largely ‘state-led’. The
country has been seriously criticized for its maladministration of the SARS outbreak
and for its lack of commitment toward global health governance. One of the
challenges China is facing is how to accommodate the demands for post-
Westphalian health governance while upholding its state-centrism.
General neglect of China’s health governance in International Relations
Over the past decade, there have been a growing number of studies about China’s
external behaviour and its involvement with international institutions. The majority
of these studies focus on its participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping
missions (Kim 1999), arms control (Johnston 1996, Swaine and Tellis 2000, Frieman
2004), human rights (Kent 1999), and international finance and trade (Economy and
Oksenberg 1999, Pearson 2000, G. Chan 2004, G. Chan 2006). There are also studies
which examine the impact of international actors working within China on
environmental issues (Economy 2004, Morton 2005). However, there is a general
neglect in the international relations scholarship of health governance in China as
well as its participation in global health governance. Crucial issues, such as the extent
of China’s involvement in global health governance, and the consequences of such
involvement for China as well as the world, are under-assessed. This paper argues
that a careful analysis of China’s record of compliance and non-compliance, with
global health regimes, can help to increase our understanding of its role in the
international community and the processes and dilemmas of its international
engagement.































International scepticism of China’s health situation
The three large-scale outbreaks of pandemic viruses in the twentieth century (the
1918 Spanish influenza, the 1956 Asian influenza, and the 1968 Hong Kong
influenza) were widely believed to have originated in Asia (McIlroy 2003).4 The 1918
influenza pandemic killed more than 20 million people worldwide. The 1956 and
1968 influenza originated in southern China and, ultimately, spread across the globe
and killed two to five million people worldwide (Ricci 2006). More recently, SARS,
the first severe global epidemic in the twenty-first century, also first appeared in
Guangdong, southern China. Owing to China’s denial and concealment in the first
several months, SARS rapidly spread around the world and led to panic across
countries.
Due to China’s non-transparency, the international community treats China’s
health reports with scepticism. Some even suspect that SARS may be a prelude to
another, even more dangerous, pandemic from China (Kleinman and Watson 2006).
If we do not want history to repeat itself, SARS may serve as a wake-up call for
policy-makers, as well as academia, to pay more attention to China’s health
governance. As Kleinman and Watson (2006: 1) claim, ‘SARS need not be the
prelude to something far worse if governments and public health agencies learn from
the events of 2003’. To avert another outbreak of health disaster, we need to
understand the processes and dilemmas of China’s engagement in global health
governance.
China’s ailing healthcare system5
During Mao’s revolutionary era, China’s healthcare system was comparatively more
equitable and effective than it is now, with the provision of basic medical care for all.
Its healthcare system then was often praised as a model for the Third World. Along
with economic reforms, China’s public health system has, since the early 1980s,
switched to a user-pay, market-oriented system. While it is true that scientific and
medical skill has improved as a result of the reform, overall, China’s medical reform
has been a failure in terms of public access to medical care. Under a user-pay health
system, people’s basic health rights are no longer guaranteed. In many rural areas,
public health services have almost collapsed. The Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences published in May 2006 a report entitled Zhongguo yiliao weisheng fazhan
baogao, commonly known as The Health Care Green Book, explicitly attributing the
sorry state of the country’s public health system to the dearth of government
financial support. The report says that the government should bear the primary
responsibility for this failure (Du et al. 2006).
More seriously, the present health system is an emergency system; it does not
form an effective regular system that would include such measures as the prevention
and treatment of contagious diseases (China AIDS Survey 2006). With the
implementation of the ‘management responsibility system’, there has been a shift
of emphasis in hospitals from preventive care facilities to those that can make profit.
Many anti-epidemic stations and preventive care institutions have shrunk accord-
ingly (Hu and Jiang 1998).6 As a consequence, some infectious diseases, such as
tuberculosis and schistosomiasis, have resurfaced in rural areas.7 China’s ailing
public health system has exposed its deficiencies and weaknesses in controlling such































emerging infectious diseases as hepatitis, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, SARS, and avian
flu. It has been argued that China is now facing a significant health security
challenge and that its security threats are largely domestic in nature (Thompson
2004).
The tarnished image of China’s healthcare system has led some local officials to
refrain from disclosing information about outbreaks of disease in their localities.
Particularly fearful of scaring foreign investors and tourists, they are often at pains
to cover up. Those brave and defiant enough to expose the truth about infectious
diseases have often been scolded for being unpatriotic and ‘anti-government’.
China’s participation in global health governance
Since the dawn of the twenty-first century, there has been a remarkable change in
China’s public health policy, from denials and cover-ups to being more proactive and
embracing multilateralism in managing its looming health crisis. Toward the end of
the last century, particularly during and after the Asian financial crisis of 19971998,
China began to be concerned about its international image. It not only uses a
multilateral approach to deal with various international issues, but also aspires to
portray itself as a responsible state in the global community. In the health realm, the
central government has been paying more attention to health issues at the domestic
level as well as on the international front.
The ailing state of China’s health system has been officially admitted by the
government. In August 2005, a joint report issued by the State Council’s
Development Research Centre and the World Bank pointed a finger at China’s
public healthcare system for its failure to prevent and control both serious chronic
diseases and infectious diseases (China AIDS Survey 2006). This might be the first
official criticism levelled at the public healthcare system.
Two perspectives can be used to evaluate China’s role and nature of its
involvement in global health governance: the internal and the external dimension.
As Raimo Va¨yrynen (1999: xi) argues cogently, ‘Global governance cannot replace
the need for good governance in national societies; in fact, in the absence of quality
local governance, global and regional arrangements are bound to fail or will have
only limited effectiveness’. The following section, therefore, investigates China’s
response to its public health crises and its domestic governance of the three diseases,
followed by an examination of its role in regional and international fora.
HIV/AIDS
Since the first reported case of AIDS in China in 1985, the Chinese government had
concealed or denied the existence of an AIDS crisis in the country for more than 15
years. China’s transparency problem in revealing the real situation of HIV/AIDS has
often been reported by various sources. One example is its denial of an outbreak in
central China among farmers who contracted HIV/AIDS through a dubious
government-sponsored, blood-selling programme in the early 1990s. In June 2001,
the central government finally admitted the problem of HIV/AIDS, and began to be
increasingly concerned about the negative impact of the pandemic on society as well
as the economy. According to UN agencies and the Chinese government, which
released the latest official figure in early 2006, the estimated number of HIV carriers































in China is 650,000 (MOH et al. 2006, Yardley 2006).8 The overall HIV prevalence in
the country is not high, at approximately 0.05%. However, the UN agencies warn
that the new infection rate of HIV in China shows no signs of abating. In 2005 alone,
there were 70,000 new cases of HIV in the country. To make things worse, the disease
tends to have spread from high-risk groups to normal citizens (Ma 2006a).
Domestic governance
Since China admitted the problem of HIV/AIDS in 2001, and especially since late
2003, there has been a striking increase in its commitment to tackling the disease
both domestically and internationally. Domestically, Premier Wen Jiabao and
President Hu Jintao paid high-profile visits to AIDS patients in December 2003
and in November 2004, respectively, indicating that the central leaders wanted to
show that they were taking the issue seriously.9 In February 2004, a new State
Council AIDS Working Committee was established under the leadership of Vice
Premier Wu Yi to coordinate and promote collaboration among government
agencies, the private sector, and civil society (State Council AIDS Working
Committee Office and UNAIDS in China 2004). During the National People’s
Congress meeting in March 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated the central
government’s determination to improve China’s public health system, particularly
in fighting HIV/AIDS. In June 2005, in an executive meeting of the State Council,
the prevention, treatment, and care of HIV/AIDS was highlighted as one of the key
public health areas of the 11th National Five-Year Plan (20062010). Each level of
government was requested to standardize HIV/AIDS prevention and care work in
accordance with the law (MOH et al. 2006).
China not only has revised its Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious
Disease, and implemented regulations on AIDS prevention and control, but has also
drawn in a multiplicity of actors, state and non-state, to combat the disease.10 China
has called on the private sector to join its fight against the disease. In a summit on
AIDS, jointly hosted by the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Global Business
Coalition on HIV/AIDS, in Beijing on 18 March 2005, Vice Premier and the then
Health Minister, Wu Yi, urged private companies and NGOs to play a larger role in
halting the spread of HIV/AIDS in China. This was the first time the Chinese
government called for publicprivate partnerships in managing its health crisis.
Nevertheless, gaps between words and deeds exist in China’s health governance.
China’s transparency problem in revealing the real situation of HIV/AIDS stands
out and has been criticized by specialists and activists. While the Chinese
government now openly admits the problems and challenges of HIV/AIDS, and
allows the involvement of civil society in the campaign to combat it, ample evidence
shows that AIDS activists are still penalized or kept in detention for leaking any
negative information about the disease in localities. According to Human Rights
Watch (2005), NGOs and AIDS activists in China continue to face detention and
harassment by local authorities, especially in Henan province. The plights of Dr.
Gao Yaojie,11 Wan Yanhai,12 and Li Qianji,13 offer vivid examples.
In evaluating its national HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care policy, both
the Chinese government and UN agencies conclude that China still faces a number
of key challenges. Problems are particularly acute in localities where leaders often do
not understand sufficiently the dangers of HIV/AIDS, and the implementation of the































‘Four Frees and One Care’14 policy remains relatively ineffective in some areas.
Henan province has several notorious ‘AIDS villages’ in which farmers contracted
HIV/AIDS through dubious blood selling sponsored by local governments in the
1990s. Shangcai is one of the most seriously affected counties in the province. After
the exposure of the AIDS crisis there, both the central and local governments have
pledged to provide medical aid and financial support in order to improve the
situation. However, it was alleged that by paying lip-service to supporting the central
government’s policy on ‘Four Frees and One Care’, local officials siphoned off aid
money and resources, giving little to the patients and the people in need. More
seriously, all of the charity gifts donated by various organizations could scarcely
reach HIV/AIDS carriers or their families. Dr. Gao Yaojie called on aid groups and
people sympathetic to the victims not to raise and offer any aid to Shangcai county,
as local officials would embezzle it. She said that Shangcai county’s policy on HIV/
AIDS prevention and control was no more than a trap (Jiang 2006, Savadove
2006).15 Victims and activists have resentfully expressed that the officials in Henan
who oversaw the blood-selling scheme have not been punished, but instead been
promoted. Some remain politically powerful, not only in the province but also at the
national level (Pomfret 2003, Spencer 2004, The Economist 2007).
This view was echoed by Joel Rehnstrom of the Joint UN Programme on HIV/
AIDS (UNAIDS) China Office, who warned that the State Council Working
Committee on AIDS ‘hadn’t quite really lived up to expectations’ in effective
coordination with lower-level authorities, although the central government has been
increasingly open in handling the disease (South China Morning Post 2006). Peter
Piot, executive director of UNAIDS, also noted that there was a mismatch between
national policy made by the central government and its enforcement at local levels.
He asserted that patients and NGOs should be given more room for involvement in
the fight against the disease (Blanchard 2006a).
Global governance
On the international front, China has been playing a more active role in various
international and regional fora since the early 2000s. It has participated in the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (hereafter, the Global Fund), the
ASEAN3 Seminar on Enhancing Cooperation in the field of Non-Traditional
Security Issues, ASEAN1 Ministers of Health Seminar on fighting HIV/AIDS and
Influenza, the International AIDS Conference, and the International Congress on
AIDS in Asia and the Pacific, in addition to various UN conferences. Chinese
leaders have reiterated China’s promise to play an active role in the regional and
global efforts to combat the disease. For example, at the 15th International AIDS
Conference, held in Bangkok in 2004, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao pledged to
contribute to the regional and global fight against HIV/AIDS (Altman 2004, China
Daily 2004).16 Again, at a high-level meeting on HIV/AIDS at the 59th Session of the
UN General Assembly, held on 2 June 2005, China reiterated its commitment to the
international society in combating HIV/AIDS. A month later, Chinese delegates
attended the Seventh International Congress on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific in
Kobe, Japan.
Apart from participating in international and regional fora, China has also
actively played host to a number of international conferences on the disease,































including a ‘2005 New Strategies on Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS
International Conference’ in December 2005 (MOH 2005b), a gathering of 21
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies, to reaffirm their commit-
ment to fighting and controlling infectious diseases, in April 2006 (MOH 2006a), and
a conference on ‘East Asian Regional Cooperation to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria’ in July 2006 (MOH 2006b). China’s effort to fight HIV/AIDS also extends
to the African continent. For some time, China has sent medical practitioners to help
establish health care systems and has provided medical assistance and equipment to
many African countries. More recently, it has provided generic HIV/AIDS drugs at
affordable prices (Ta Kung Pao 2005, MOH 2006c, Zhongguo yiyao bao 2007).
As a consequence of enhanced collaboration between China and other
governments and international organizations, there are cooperation programmes
in 27 of China’s 31 provincial units (provinces, autonomous regions, and
municipalities of provincial ranks) (Gill 2006: 5). Conversely, Chinese officials,
particularly those at subnational levels, have been at pains to stress the state-led
nature of the cooperation programmes, and to prevent prominent AIDS activists
from any engagement with the rest of the world. Events taking place in the worst-hit
province of Henan are illustrative. The provincial health authorities have, since early
2003, blocked Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) from operating an HIV/AIDS
treatment project in the province (S.S. Chan 2006). Dr. Gao Yaojie was blocked in
February 2007 from leaving the country to receive a human rights award in the USA.
The Vital Voices Global Partnership, a US advocacy group promoting female
empowerment, informed Gao in October 2006 that she would be honoured in its
March 2007 banquet in Washington, DC. US Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton is an
honorary co-chair of the group.17 When Gao was about to leave Zhengzhou for
Beijing in early February 2007 to process a travel visa at the US Embassy, she was
placed under house arrest by Henan public security officers after senior provincial
officials, including Deputy Governor Chen Quanguo, allegedly failed to persuade
her not to attend the event and to meet Hillary Clinton. Gao had been prevented
from receiving two overseas awards in 2001 and 2003 (Kwok 2007, Reuters 2007,
Yardley 2007).
SARS
If HIV/AIDS is one of the most severe plagues of the twentieth century that
continues to affect us today, then SARS could be seen as the first global epidemic of
this century. From its emergence in November 2002 in Guangdong, China, the
disease sped along the air routes of the globalized world. Within months, it had
spread to 31 countries and every continent (Abraham 2005). Thanks to the timely
and adequate cooperation by governments and international institutions, this lethal
and contagious disease was contained in 8 months. On 5 July 2003, WHO declared
that the disease had been contained worldwide (WHO 2003). The assertion that
SARS is ‘the world’s first post-Westphalian pathogen’, not only indicates that the
traditional state-centric idea of international relations is no longer effective for
combating the borderless infectious diseases, but also calls for a new type of public
health governance, a more institutionally robust international public health structure
in the era of globalization (Fidler 2004: 78).
































With respect to China’s handling of SARS, the Chinese government, particularly its
Ministry of Health and Guangdong officials, initially downplayed the severity of the
disease, and suppressed information about the outbreak, while it spread out from
southern China to other Chinese provinces, as well as overseas countries. China’s
belated response, and particularly its obstruction of the entry of WHO assessment
teams into China for investigation of the virus in early 2003, was severely criticized
by the international community. Not until more than 300 people had died, with more
than 5,000 cases of infection in nearly 30 countries, and the real situation inside
Beijing had been exposed by Time magazine in April 2003, did China’s strategy of
handling the outbreak shift (Greenfeld 2006). In a Politburo meeting on 17 April
2003, the new leadership announced its heightened determination to fight the
disease. After months of denial, China’s attitude reversed and became more
cooperative and proactive. The central authorities ordered all local governments
to provide accurate, timely, and honest, reporting of SARS cases. Furthermore, at a
press conference on 20 April 2003, the Chinese government admitted that confirmed
cases of SARS in Beijing were nine times higher than the day before. In order to
restore its credibility, China swiftly removed Health Minister Zhang Wenkang, and
Beijing’s Mayor Meng Xuenong, for negligence in dealing with the crisis. WHO
teams were also granted access to Beijing, Guangdong, and other places in China to
investigate the pandemic of this atypical pneumonia. Premier Wen Jiabao described
SARS as a grave threat, and reiterated that China was willing to cooperate with all
infected countries to tackle the disease, and urged local governments to remain
transparent in handling the crisis (Wang 2003, White 2003, Saich 2006a).
Having acknowledged the SARS outbreak in Beijing and Guangzhou, Chinese
leaders implemented a more proactive and open policy to cope with the crisis. Vice
Premier Wu Yi was appointed Minister of Health to oversee the management of a
special SARS task force. This was the first time that the Chinese government
appointed such a high-ranking and prestigious official to head the Ministry of
Health, showing the government’s determination to remedy the situation.18 The new
leadership, led by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, made a visible
gesture toward supporting the government’s openness in combating the disease. In
order to encourage more concerted efforts in fighting this lethal virus, Hu inspected
SARS-affected cities of Tianjin, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, in mid-April 2003,
while Wen visited SARS-stricken universities, hospitals, shopping malls, and
residential communities in Beijing in late April 2003 (Xinhua News Agency 2003b).
Global governance
On the international front, before the SARS outbreak, China endorsed the ASEAN-
Disease-Surveillance.net network in September 2000 (SEANIDOS), and the APEC
Infectious Diseases Strategy in October 2001 (APEC 2001), and pledged to facilitate
regional cooperation to improve surveillance of infectious disease outbreaks.
However, the SARS outbreak of 20022003 demonstrated that China did not follow
these surveillance measures closely. On 22 March 2003, the WHO regional director
in the Western Pacific Regional Office, Shigeru Omi, urged China, fruitlessly, to
increase transparency in information sharing about the outbreak in Guangdong, in a































one-to-one meeting in Hong Kong with China’s then Minister of Health, Zhang
Wenkang. Thus, 10 days later, the Beijing Office of WHO informed the Chinese
government that it would issue that day a travel advisory against unnecessary travel
to the province (Foreman 2006, Omi 2006).
A rather weird event happened at the end of April 2003. The ASEAN member
states, initiated by Singapore, held a ‘Special ASEAN Leaders Meeting on SARS’ in
Bangkok with the aim of enhancing regional collaboration in containing the spread
of SARS in the region. Initially, China was excluded from the meeting. One week
before it was convened, Thailand swiftly announced that Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao would join the summit in a ‘Special ASEAN-China Leaders Meeting on
SARS’ on 29 April 2003 (Xinhua News Agency 2003a). It was widely believed that
China took the initiative in approaching Thailand to make a request for
participation in the summit. In his first international meeting after taking the office
of premiership a month ago, Wen explicitly stated, ‘I came here in a candid spirit
[with a] responsible and trustworthy attitude to co-operate [with other countries]’
(Chou Wiest 2003a). During the summit, in addition to signing a joint declaration on
controlling the spread of SARS, China pledged to contribute 10 million yuan
(US$1.2 million) to set up China-ASEAN cooperation programmes for controlling
SARS (Gang 2003, Vatikiotis 2003). Obviously, China’s more proactive cooperation
was an effort to remedy its tarnished international reputation, and to relieve the
pressure from the international community during the SARS outbreak.19
Subsequently, China has proactively participated in various ASEAN regional
fora, such as the ‘ASEAN3’ Ministers of Health Special Meeting on SARS in April
2003 in Kuala Lumpur and, again, in Siem Reap, Cambodia, in June 2003. During
the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, all members agreed to undertake several measures to
fight the disease. They included the establishment of a ‘hotline’ network to facilitate
communications in an emergency, for the exchange of information, and the carrying
out of stringent pre-departure screenings at airports and seaports. In addition, at a
regional conference held in the Philippines in mid-May 2003, China, Japan, South
Korea, and all ASEAN members, with the exception of Myanmar, agreed to
implement a number of standardized measures to stop the spread of the disease in
the region (Guo 2003, Lo 2003). To further operationalize the ministerial directives
agreed upon in the summit meetings, an ‘ASEAN3 Action Plan on Prevention and
Control of SARS and Other Infectious Disease’ was adopted in June 2003.
As a member of the APEC forum, China threw its weight behind the APEC
Action Plan on SARS. In the APEC Health Ministers’ Meeting, held in Bangkok in
late June 2003, Vice Premier and Health Minister Wu Yi affirmed the importance of
international mechanisms, including APEC, the ASEAN, and WHO, in the global
fight against SARS. She reiterated China’s commitment to working closely with
other APEC members (China Daily 2003). During the second ‘Special ASEAN3
Health Ministers Meeting on SARS’, in Siem Reap in the same month, ASEAN
ministers praised China’s ‘utmost efforts to improve the quality and timeliness of
surveillance’, despite their belief that China could make further contributions to the
global containment (ASEAN 2003).
This seemingly open and cooperative strategy in health governance has its
limitations. Jiang Yanyong, a SARS whistleblower, initially received an official
acknowledgement for prompting the Chinese government to launch a massive public
health campaign to combat SARS (Friess 2003, Jakes 2003, Greenfeld 2006).20 In































spite of that, not long after the acknowledgement, he was taken into custody. After it
was announced that he would be awarded the Ramon Magsaysay Award in 2004, for
his contribution to revealing the government’s SARS cover-up in early 2003, he was
barred from leaving the country to receive the award (S.S. Chan 2004).
Whether China’s impulse to be more proactive in international fora was driven by
a commitment to providing public goods for health, or was meant as a gesture to
remedy its tarnished international reputation, or was a response to its domestic
dangers, is still a matter of guesswork. However, the determined exclusion of Taiwan
from WHO exemplifies China’s position to uphold the principle of national
sovereignty or supreme power over people and territory. Since 1972, Taiwan has
been excluded from the World Health Assembly (the policymaking body of WHO)
due to the ‘one China policy’ and political pressure from Beijing. So far, Taiwan’s
annual attempts to join the World Health Assembly as an observer since 1997 have
failed (China Daily 2006a). The SARS outbreak in 2003 raised a concern,
particularly from the perspective of Taiwan, about political intervention in providing
global public goods for health. Denis Aitken, WHO assistant director-general,
argues that under the memorandum of understanding on Taiwan, signed between
Beijing and the UN health agency in 2005, information flow is fully covered on the
island (Higgins 2006, Hille et al. 2006). Taiwan’s health and medical experts can
attend and participate in WHO technical activities, though with Beijing’s consent.
The agreement also allows WHO to send experts to Taiwan in emergency situations.
Nevertheless, China is at pains to block any attempt by Taiwan to be an observer or
member of WHO.
Avian flu
Avian flu captures global attention because its case-fatality rate is higher than other
infectious diseases. Since H5N1 re-emerged in Asia in December 2003, the virus has
already spread to 11 countries in four continents. As of 12 June 2007, a total of 190
people have been killed, representing almost 61% of reported human cases of
infection since 2003. While Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand are the three hardest
hit countries, the fatality rate in China of 64% is higher than the average of the 12
affected countries, and the death toll in China was the fourth highest, after
Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand (WHO 2007). Health experts and WHO officials
fear that a highly pathogenic avian influenza, H5N1 virus, may mutate into a form
that is easily communicable among humans. The first laboratory-confirmed case of
human-to-human transmission occurred in May 2006 in northern Sumatra,
Indonesia, where seven people, of an extended family of eight, died of H5N1
(Rosenthal 2006a, South China Morning Post 2006). Although experts have asserted
that human flu transfers could exceed more than those reported, WHO still
maintains the pandemic alert system at level 3, which means ‘no or very limited
humanhuman transmission’ (McNeil 2006a). However, the possibility for this
human influenza pandemic to kill millions of people, and cause catastrophic
economic consequences, cannot be underestimated. On 20 December 2005, China
and WHO signed a cooperative deal, by which China would be committed to being
transparent in sharing samples of human flu viruses with the UN agency (Zhang and
Zhao 2005). The question is, will China comply fully with this agreement?
































The SARS outbreak triggered a learning process whereby officials at all levels have
been alerted to the importance of transparency in tackling public health crises.
Officials explicitly admitted that the government had learned from the SARS
outbreak and had tried to strengthen its disease surveillance system. In response to
questions as to whether or not Chinese officials had attempted to cover up the bird
flu cases, Cai Wu, Director of China’s State Council Information Office, commented
in Australia in April 2006, that ‘some high-ranking officials in China paid a very high
price’ in managing the SARS crisis, and that the Chinese government ‘asked officials
to release information on bird flu in a very timely manner’ (Fitzsimons 2006).
China’s initial response to the outbreak of this highly pathogenic avian influenza was
more open and cautious than its previous responses to infectious disease outbreaks.
Since the avian flu issue was raised in the international community in 2005, China
has organized an aggressive campaign to stem the outbreaks.
In March 2006, the Ministry of Health issued a sharply worded statement
warning local officials that any cover-up or deliberate delay in reporting could risk
spreading the disease. While denying any cover-up of bird flu, China acknowledged
that there were delays in releasing information at local levels (Ma 2004, Zamiska
2006b,c). Officials from WHO also noted China’s improvement in epidemic
notification and transparency in urban areas. Nevertheless, local farmers might be
reluctant to report infections because of the lack of financial compensation (Lee
2006). Overall, problems with notification are largely due to the insufficient and poor
technical surveillance system, and China ‘did not do it deliberately’, according to
Christianne Bruschke, head of the bird flu task force at the World Organization for
Animal Health (Rosenthal 2006b).
The implementation of national plans to fight the avian flu, however, meets
several obstacles. In China, many vaccines available from the market are not reliable.
For instance, it was reported that unlicensed vaccines were sold to farmers in
Liaoning, a northeastern province (Sipress 2005). After bird flu began killing
chickens across the province in late 2005, officials quietly distributed an old antiviral
drug, which was made with amantadine and available in abundance, as a pre-emptive
method to prevent it. Scientific evidence has shown that the majority of bird-flu
strains circulating in Asia are resistant to amantadine. This incident has already bred
concern from WHO, which declared that ‘the mass use of antiviral drugs
prophylactically is not something the WHO would advise’ (Zamiska 2006a). While
fake vaccines leave poultry unprotected, substandard vaccines could be even more
dangerous. They cover the symptoms of bird flu without blocking the virus. Poultry
become silent spreaders, making it even harder for farmers and experts to monitor,
control, and prevent any outbreak.21 It has been widely believed that China lacks the
resources and basic hygiene precautions and administration to avoid improper
inoculation.
Global governance
China’s participation in the global fight against avian influenza has also been
proactive. It has attended various regional and global summits that deal with the
pandemic. A joint statement, which China signed with 13 Asia-Pacific countries in































November 2004, was an important step in enhancing multilateral cooperation in
addressing the avian-flu crisis (Straits Times 2004). In order to facilitate cooperation
and sharing information and data, China and the 20 other APEC members endorsed
the Action Plan on the Prevention and Response to Avian and Influenza Pandemics
in May 2006, during an APEC forum in Vietnam (Krause 2006, Xinhua Online
2006).
There are, however, competing observations relating to China’s compliant and
proactive behaviour. China’s efforts to cooperate with international institutions in
preventing and controlling bird flu have been praised by the international
community. UN health officials agree that China has been honest with the
international community about its latest outbreaks of bird flu (South China Morning
Post 2005). Together with the World Bank and the European Commission, the
Chinese government organized an International Pledging Conference on Avian and
Human Influenza, in Beijing on 1718 January 2006, with the aim of calling on
various countries to provide financial support to combat avian influenza. Lee Jong-
Wook, then Director-General of WHO, commented that China’s central government
was committed to sharing information about bird flu cases. By hosting international
conferences, the Chinese government also wanted to show its commitment to
information sharing and global responsibility.22 China’s commitment to combating
avian flu was commended by the US government; Elias Zerhouni, Director of the
National Institutes of Health of the United States, said in her visit to Beijing in
December 2005, that Chinese scientists and government leaders had been completely
open in providing information on the H5N1 virus (Enav 2005).
In contrast, China seems reluctant to share, with WHO, crucial information on
the development of H5N1. Despite the fact that the health organization urges China
to give it more virus samples, China has offered little since 2004, until shortly after
Margaret Chan, a Hong Kong Chinese citizen, was elected head of the organization
in November 2006.23 Gaps in China’s bird flu reporting system became apparent in
late June 2006, when eight Chinese scientists wrote, in the New England Journal of
Medicine, that a 24-year-old soldier, admitted to a Beijing hospital in November
2003, died of H5N1 in early December 2003, having initially been diagnosed as
SARS-infected. WHO asked the Chinese government for information about the
discrepancy, but received only a lukewarm response. Its Ministry of Health said on
10 July 2006, 2 weeks after the publication, that it was waiting for the results of tests
carried out on the soldier. More confusing still, after the report on the findings was
submitted to the journal, one of the scientists allegedly asked for its withdrawal
(Benitez and Ma 2006, Ma 2006b,d, McNeil 2006b, The Economist 2006).
Eventually, in late July 2006, Beijing invited WHO to send experts to take part in
retrospective tests on the first possible human H5N1 death discovered on the
mainland (Ma 2006e). The cause of the soldier’s death was confirmed in early August
2006.24 This incident overturns the initial understanding that the virus re-emerged in
poultry in South Korea, in December 2003, and then spread to Vietnam in the same
month.
Theorizing China’s participation in global health governance
Several hypotheses can be formulated about China’s changing governance policy
on infectious diseases and improved compliance with global norms and rules25:































(a) rational utilitarian calculations, (b) securitization of communicable diseases, and
(c) international concerns about good governance and self-projection as a
responsible state.
Rational utilitarian calculations
China perceives multilateralism and global health governance instrumentally in
terms of rational utilitarian calculations of tangible costs and benefits. As Yong
Deng (1999) has argued, since the 1990s China’s leaders have seen the virtue of
multilateralism, and realized the importance of interdependence in the promotion of
its national interests. By admitting that its ailing healthcare system is too fragile to
control emerging infectious diseases, and by acknowledging deficiencies in handling
its HIV/AIDS problem, China can gain access to international resources and
technical assistance, and cement cooperation with international state and non-state
actors. For instance, shortly before China adjusted its population of HIV/AIDS
sufferers in 2001, it was in the process of submitting an application to the Global
Fund for a grant worth US$90 million.26
Since its admission of the AIDS crisis, China has entered into cooperation with
more than 20 international organizations and countries, which provide it with
financial or medical assistance to prevent and control the epidemic (China Daily
2004). For example, China has collaborated with the US Global AIDS Pro-
gramme since 2002, although the two governments do not always agree with each
other on issues such as human rights and Taiwan. Northeast China’s Heilongjiang
province is one of the beneficiaries of such collaboration. Since June 2004, the US
Global AIDS Programme has helped to set up 15 of the province’s 21 HIV
surveillance sites at disease control and prevention centres. The US government
announced, in June 2005, that it would commit over US$35 million for HIV/AIDS-
related activities in China between 2006 and 2008 (Embassy of the PRC in Australia
2005). Financial and medical assistance has also come from such international
institutions as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Clinton
Foundation, the Global Fund, and the Global Business Coalition on HIV/
AIDS.27 In meeting Peter Piot of the UNAIDS in Beijing in September 2006, He
Luli, vice-chairwoman of the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress,
said that China needs more support from the UN body to treat its AIDS patients
and to prevent the spread of the disease (Xinhua News Agency 2006).
The Chinese government realizes that it also needs the help of the private sector
to control the disease. In a summit on AIDS in Beijing, jointly hosted by the
Ministry of Health and the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, in March
2005, Vice Premier and Health Minister, Wu Yi, urged private companies and NGOs
to play a larger role in halting the spread of HIV/AIDS in China. This was an
unprecedented move in calling for publicprivate partnerships in managing its health
crisis. As of December 2005, a total of 26 international companies had already
established, or had committed to implementing, non-discrimination policies for
HIV/AIDS for their China-based employees (The Corporate Social Responsibility
Newswire Service 2005). Apart from that, the Ministry of Health, Merck & Co., a
pharmaceutical company, and the Merck Company Foundation have recently co-
organized a project known as ‘HIV/AIDS Community-Based Prevention Initiative’.
They have invited private companies to participate, on a contracting-out basis, in































designing a community-based HIV/AIDS prevention and education programme in
Zhaojue and Butuo counties, Sichuan province, where the rate of HIV/AIDS
infection is high (MOH 2005a, Distlerath 2006). A publicprivate partnership,
known as the China Health Alliance, was launched by the Global Health Initiative
of the World Economic Forum in September 2006. The Alliance brings together
private companies, the Chinese government, UN agencies, and NGOs to implement
HIV and tuberculosis programmes for migrant workers in rural workplaces (IPR
2006, Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Report 2006).
In summary, because China is short of human and material resources in dealing
with the deadly disease alone, it badly needs the participation of transnational actors.
Cooperation with them could draw them into assisting the domestic campaign to
halt the transmission of HIV. Acting out of this rational calculation of its interests,
China is inclined to cooperate with various international organizations in tackling its
HIV/AIDS problem.
Communicable diseases as an identifiable threat
Since 2000, the United Nations has played a critical role in securitizing HIV/AIDS,
constructing the disease as a security threat that demands international attention and
action (McInnes 2006). In January 2000, Kofi Annan argued, in a UN Security
Council meeting on HIV/AIDS, that ‘AIDS is causing socioeconomic crises which, in
turn, threaten political stability’ (Vienna International Centre of United Nations
Information Service 2000). The first Security Council meeting in 2000, the first one
in the new millennium, was also the first Security Council meeting that addressed a
health issue. Five months later, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) not
only reaffirmed the commitments to achieving gender equality, development, and
empowerment of women, made earlier in the ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action’, but also highlighted the need to combat HIV/AIDS as one of the 12 priority
areas to achieve advancement and empowerment of women.28 In July of the same
year, the Security Council gave prominence to the security significance of the
epidemic in the watershed Resolution 1308.29 Subsequently, the UNGA adopted, in
September 2000, Resolution 55/2, known as UN Millennium Declaration, calling for
halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS, particularly in Africa. The UNGA
convened a special session on AIDS in June 2001, and adopted the Declaration of
Commitment on HIV/AIDS (UN General Assembly 2000). In the following year, the
Global Fund was established. With the UN devoting increasing awareness to the
epidemic, the link between HIV/AIDS and insecurity had been established in
international policy discourse and agenda.
Peter Piot proclaimed that HIV/AIDS is a catastrophe both from a public health
perspective and from the perspective of its political and socioeconomic impacts. He
stressed the need for political leaders to mobilize a multilateral response to HIV/
AIDS (Piot 2000). As early as 1997, the UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS warned in
its report, ‘China Responds to AIDS’, jointly published with the Chinese Ministry of
Health, that there would be a potential pandemic in China. If the government did
not respond effectively, the total number of HIV/AIDS in China in 2010 could rise to
10 million (UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS and Chinese Ministry of Health 1997).
The Chinese government came under further scathing attack by the UN Theme
Group in 2002, for failing to contain or treat the disease. The UN Group said, in a































report entitled ‘HIV/AIDS: China’s Titanic Peril’, that China’s effort to stem the
epidemic had an ‘infinitesimally small impact’ and that China was ‘on the verge of a
catastrophe that could result in unimaginable suffering, economic loss, and social
devastation’. The UN Group blamed a lack of commitment and leadership on the
part of government officials, at many levels, and insufficient openness about HIV/
AIDS for the slow progress in combating the disease (Chang 2002, Pan 2002).
It is likely that China’s long-standing, active interactions with various UN
agencies have triggered a learning process whereby China modifies its understanding
of the vulnerability of HIV/AIDS and, accordingly, defines it as an identifiable
security threat. With a new conception of security that blurs the boundary between
low politics and high politics, China has, since 2001, framed the looming HIV/AIDS
epidemic as a global security issue rather than a domestic social issue.30 The
conceptualization of contagious diseases as security threats has gained strength since
the SARS outbreak.31 Against this background, there is little wonder that Peter Piot
was invited to the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party, in June
2005, to speak on the challenges of AIDS to society, to a group of promising central
and local officials who were groomed for promotion by receiving short-term training
programmes at the School (Piot 2005).
International community’s prodding on governance and self-projection as a responsible
state
Another possible motivation for China to change tack is the normative pressure
from the international community and its aspiration to become a ‘responsible’ state.
Globalization is considered a ‘two-edged sword’ (shuangren jian) by Chinese leaders.
While China proactively integrates itself into the globalized world, in pursuit of
economic development, integration requires China to embrace a multilateral
approach and the underlying values of global management. As Rosemary Foot
has argued, when China started to rejoin the international society in the late 1970s,
the criteria of a responsible state were being changed from pluralist to solidarist
concepts whereby ‘common values and some notion of the common good’ were
given priority (Foot 2001). The notion of ‘good governance’ and the associated
‘Washington Consensus’, which originated in the Washington-based international
financial institutions, have later been embraced by the United Nations and other
international development agencies, such as the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) (World Bank 1992, 1994, Asian Development Bank
1995). The World Bank emphasizes the institutional environment in which the
development process takes place and, accordingly, brings to the fore the ingredients
of effective management of the development process. The ADB further consolidates
the concept of good governance by identifying four elements: accountability,
participation by stakeholders, predictability based on the rule of law, and
transparency in information flow about government policy and decisions. Before
the Asian financial crisis of 19971998, the ADB (Asian Development Bank 1995)
warned, in its report ‘Governance: Sound Development Management’, that
governments in the region had not yet established direct correlation between the
political environment and rapid economic growth and social development. Since the
financial crisis, the demand for transparency in the disclosure of information in
government decision-making and public policy implementation has reached its































zenith. The United Nations Development Programme has specifically asserted that
good governance is crucial for combating HIV/AIDS (Hsu 2000, UNDP 2002).
Poor transparency in Chinese government decision-making has always been
highlighted for criticism by the international community. International NGOs have
often claimed that China under-reports the seriousness of its HIV/AIDS problem. At
the end of the twentieth century, there were many castigating reports about China’s
‘AIDS villages’ in Henan. China’s maladministration of the SARS outbreak further
exacerbated other countries’ scepticism of China’s responsibility to the international
community. During the SARS outbreak, China was ostracized by the international
community. With these bitter experiences, the Chinese government has felt an
overwhelming desire to seek cooperation with the international society in providing
global public goods for health to its own citizens, as well as to the global community.
For example, Premier Wen Jiabao asserted, during the SARS outbreak, ‘We [the
Chinese government] are a government not only responsible to China’s 1.3 billion
people, but also to the world’ (Chou Wiest 2003b).
Why is China so sensitive to the evaluations made by others in the international
community? In the parlance of liberal institutionalism, a good reputation will lead to
more favourable terms of engagement for China with other countries, not only in the
health regime, but also in other areas, such as trade and human rights. Its compliant
behaviour in one issue-area will lower the transaction cost of its participation in
other areas (Chayes and Chayes 1995). Chinese culture also attaches importance to
good standing in peer groups.
By showing that it behaves responsibly, China strengthens its soft or normative
power in the international community. By showcasing itself as a responsible state,
China’s policy has shifted from a purely Sino-centric worldview to one which stresses
China’s role in, and its contribution to, global peace and security. By turning this
rhetoric into practice, China aims not only at promoting ‘good governance’ in
curtailing the spread of infectious diseases, but also earning a reputation as a
responsible great power.
That said, there is no compelling evidence to support the claim that China’s
compliant behaviour results from a sense of duty or obligation to global efforts to
contain the spread of diseases. China has not yet fully internalized the norms of
cooperative multilateralism and transparency in reporting and data-sharing. There
seems to be little or no fundamental change in the way China perceives itself and
others. The Draft Law on Emergency Management constitutes an example. The bill,
under review by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in June
July 2006, threatens to impose fines, ranging from 50,000 yuan to 100,000 yuan, on
news media for reporting on public emergencies with no prior government
authorization. Public emergencies include natural disasters, outbreaks of epidemics,
and social unrest. Although Chinese officials stress that the law is to upgrade the
country’s ability to cope with outbreaks of natural and industrial hazards and health
crises, critics warn that the law would give much leeway to local governments to
cover up outbreaks of public-health crises by forcing mass media to seek approvals
before reporting on the outbreaks (China Internet Information Center 2006, Fowler
and Qin 2006, Kahn 2006, Ma 2006c). Although the relative importance of the three
factors discussed above are difficult to gauge, together they help to increase our
understanding of China’s behaviour in global health governance.
































The three case studies of HIV/AIDS, SARS, and avian flu show that China’s
increasing participation in global health governance since the turn of the century has
been driven by both necessity and conscious design. By admitting its AIDS problem
in 2001, China has cemented cooperation with various state and non-state actors.
China has skilfully utilized multilateralism to gain access to international resources
and technical assistance. Furthermore, its frequent interactions with United Nations
agencies have triggered a learning process that has, subsequently, led it to securitize
communicable diseases as a security threat. Globalization has accelerated the
movement of viruses and diseases across national boundaries. China’s practice of
hiding domestic outbreaks of diseases has been severely criticized by the interna-
tional community. International concerns about good governance, particularly after
the Asian financial crisis of 19971998, have put China under normative pressure to
change tack. Obviously, its maladministration of the SARS outbreak has exacer-
bated other countries’ scepticism of China’s responsibility to the international
community. Wary of being ostracized by the international community, the Chinese
government has consolidated its desire to seek cooperation with international society
in regard to non-traditional security issues. In the wake of the SARS outbreak in
2003, China’s participation in global health governance has, therefore, increased
rapidly and become more proactive.
Overall, China’s active participation and cooperation, in providing global public
goods for health, has made a positive impact on regional as well as international
security. The central government is now using an increasingly multilateral and
cooperative approach to global health governance. Chinese leaders have shown their
determination to combat infectious diseases despite problematic implementation at
the local levels. If China’s understanding of national sovereignty can continue the
current evolutionary process, from a narrow focus on territorial and jurisdictional
dimensions to one that allows multilateralism to deal with non-traditional security
issues, then it would seem that China is bending toward a post-Westphalian concept
of handling public health issues, and would become more flexible in dealing with
infectious diseases, regarded as non-traditional security issues.32 However, its
concern over territorial and jurisdictional sovereignties, the areas of conventional
understanding, is still dominant. The issue of Taiwan’s participation in WHO has
sparked off a controversy about China’s political intervention in providing global
public goods for health. It is still uncertain whether a higher level of cooperative
behaviour, and compliance with international regulatory rules, exhibited by China,
masks short-term utilitarian reasons and whether the anachronistic Westphalian
concept of sovereignty would impede an uninterrupted supply of global public goods
for health.
In addition, while China has involved a wide range of actors in combating HIV/
AIDS inside the country, its tolerance towards the activities of NGOs is frustrating.
NGOs and AIDS activists in China continue to face detention and harassment by
local authorities. In the wake of ‘colour revolutions’ in three post-communist states
of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan in 20032005, China has expressed concerns
about the proliferation of domestic and international NGOs, as well as their
operations in China, and goes to great pains to tighten its control over their activities
(Saich 2006b).33 If global health governance depends on good governance at home,































then it would seem that China still has a long way to go toward making substantial
contributions to global health governance.
Furthermore, while China often alleges that the prevailing global order favours
predominant powers disproportionately, and is, therefore, not conducive to the
development of less developed countries, including it (Yu 2002, Shi 2002), as shown
in our analysis on the role and nature of China’s engagement with global health
governance, it is focusing more on gaining credibility with institutions of global
governance than challenging the power relations, as well as the core values
underpinning the workings of the institutions. Only recently have practitioners in
the academic and policymaking circles in China paid scant attention to the
discussions about global governance. Therefore, it is not surprising that there has
not been any blueprint for reforming China’s mechanisms of global governance
(Pang 2006).34 Nevertheless, whether China, with increasing economic, political, and
normative clout, would comply with global (strictly speaking, Western) norms and
rules, without any qualification, is a moot point.
Hence, the debate over whether China will steadfastly engage in global health
governance is likely to go on. Actors in the issue-area of public health have reasons
to be suspicious of China’s present and future motives. Would China change its spots
as a consequence of a change of heart resulting from a rise in power? Perhaps the
looming avian flu pandemic could provide a litmus test for the country’s concern
over global health governance.
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Notes
1. The report is available at http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/ Accessed 13 February 2007.
2. According to the International Health Regulations, states’ international legal obligations
are to report outbreaks of cholera, plague, and yellow fever. SARS, a new pathogenic
lethal disease, was not included in the regulations by that time. Therefore, strictly
speaking, China owed no international legal obligation to involve WHO in addressing the
SARS problem within its territory.
3. There is an extensive and growing literature, including Altman (2003), Brundtland (2003),
Chen et al. (2003a,b), Heymann (2003), Lee (2003a,b), Curley and Thomas (2004), Prins
(2004), Doyle (2006), Elbe (2006), McInnes and Lee (2006). The March 2006 edition of
International Affairs is devoted to the study of HIV/AIDS.
4. The origins of the 1918 Spanish influenza are under debate. Some scientists believe that it
originated in Guangdong, China.
5. For a more detailed account on China’s healthcare system, see L.H. Chan (2006).
6. For example, the proportion of spending on preventive care in the government’s recurrent
health budget dropped from 23% in 1978 to 18% in 1994.
7. A total of 842,525 people in nearly 3,900 townships and towns in China had
schistosomiasis (also known as snail fever; xuexichong bing) in 2004 and an estimated
30 million are at risk. See 2005 nian Zhongguo weisheng tongji diyao [China’s Public Health
Statistical Digest 2005], Ministry of Health, People’s Republic of China. Accessed 1
March 2006, available at www.moh.gov.cn; 2005 Zhongguo weisheng tongji nianjian
[China’s Public Health Statistical Yearbook 2005], p. 246; and Yardley (2005).
8. In 2003, the official figure of the estimated number of HIV/AIDS in China was 840,000.
On 25 January 2005, the Chinese government and the UN agencies endorsed the new































figure of 650,000, down by 22%. The Chinese government said the adjustment was mainly
caused by its overestimate of the number of people who were infected by illicit blood
trading in the 1990s. The government released the news after months of delay because
officials feared that a significantly lower number of HIV infections might draw criticism
and doubt over the data. Both the Chinese government and the UN agencies agreed that
the new estimate was derived from better data collection and calculation models, although
some HIV/AIDS activists and NGOs still questioned the reliability of the data. See
UNAIDS and WHO (2006).
9. World AIDS Day takes place every year on 1 December.
10. The regulations were approved by the National People’s Congress, China’s legislature, in
January 2006. They stipulate the principles, roles and responsibilities of government
departments at national and local levels in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS
(Embassy of the PRC in the USA 2006).
11. Dr. Gao, a 78-year-old gynaecologist in Henan province, has been named an AIDS
crusader and has fought the scourge of HIV/AIDS since 1996. After exposing the HIV/
AIDS epidemic and the misconduct of health officials and private entrepreneurs in the
collection and dissemination of blood in the province, Dr. Gao was accused of being ‘anti-
government’. In the wake of a 3-hour private meeting between Wu Yi and her (with the
exclusion of Henan officials) during Wu’s visit to the province in December 2003, the
central government began to be more tolerant of her activities in the country. The national
China Central Television (CCTV) honoured her with the ‘Touching China’ award in
February 2004. In addition, she recently got her new books, Yiwan fengxin [Ten Thousand
Letters] (2004), and Zhongguo aizibing tiaocha [The Investigation of AIDS in China] (2005)
published. The books reveal her encounters in AIDS villages in the province. Interestingly,
the first book was published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), a
government think-tank in Beijing. See, among others, Agence France-Presse (2004).
12. Wan Yanhai, head of the Beijing Aizhixing Institute of Health Education, was put in jail
for 27 days in 2002, for posting on his website a Henan government document about the
HIV/AIDS outbreak there, and detained for a month in the following year for receiving a
classified document showing that the provincial officials were aware of the AIDS problem
long before their formal acknowledgement of it. See Pomfret (2003) and Russell (2006).
13. Li Qianji was a clinic worker at the Xingtai Blood Centre in Hebei province in northern
China. After appearing on a TV programme on 13 August 2004, about the problems with
Xingtai’s blood supply in which Li revealed dangerous practices of blood collection and
the sale of tainted blood and plasma to Shanghai, Beijing, and Hebei in the 1990s, Li’s
monthly salary was cut from a normal 1,500 yuan to 2.75 yuan in February 2005. The
Centre’s director claimed that his salary cut was triggered by pressure from the provincial
government. See S.S. Chan (2005).
14. The ‘Four Frees and One Care’ policy is a nationwide policy to provide: (a) Free ARV
drugs to AIDS patients who are rural residents, or people with financial difficulties living
in urban areas; (b) Free Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT); (c) Free drugs to HIV
infected pregnant women to prevent mother-to-child transmission, and HIV testing of
newborn babies; (d) Free schooling for children orphaned by AIDS; and (e) Care and
economic assistance to the households of people living with HIV/AIDS. See MOH et al.
(2006).
15. The former party secretary of Shangcai, Yang Songquan, and other local officials, were
allegedly arrested in June 2006 for appropriating 10 million yuan in HIV/AIDS-prevention
funds.
16. Accordingly, Wen Jiabao did not physically attend the conference, but his message was
recorded on a videotape shown at the conference.
17. She was harassed by Henan officials in November 2003 when she went to Tsinghua
University, Beijing, to attend an AIDS and SARS summit to which Bill Clinton delivered
a speech (Spencer 2004).
18. Wu Yi is regarded as the ‘Chinese iron lady’, renowned for her toughness in negotiations
with the USA and other nations on China’s World Trade Organization membership drive
while she was the Foreign Trade Minister.































19. Interestingly, the SARS outbreak has some positive impacts on China’s engagement with
regional and international institutions, particularly on non-traditional security issues. Its
cooperation with ASEAN on non-traditional security issues has increased and the scope
has been expanded to various non-traditional security issues, ranging from public health
to finance and to natural resources (see Tang and Zhang 2003). Accordingly, discussions
about non-traditional security among Chinese leaders and scholars have started to appear
after the SARS outbreak in 2003. For instance, with the first research project on ‘China
and non-traditional security issues’ undertaken in September 2003, the first national
academic conference on the issue was held in Beijing in December 2003, under the
auspices of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences. In order to strengthen dialogues about how to address non-traditional
security threats in the era of globalization, Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and
Politics], a monthly academic journal, published by the Institute of World Economics and
Politics, has run a special column on ‘non-traditional security studies’ since 2003 (see
Wang 2004).
20. Jiang is a retired Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) doctor and Communist Party
member. He disclosed the under-reporting of SARS cases in Beijing to Time magazine in
early April 2003. He told the magazine that in order to ensure that the National People’s
Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference could be convened
smoothly by that time, medical staff in the Beijing’s military hospitals were warned not to
publicize any information about SARS. Countering the official figure of SARS infections
at 19, with four dead in Beijing, Jiang alleged that in the No.309 PLA Hospital alone,
there were 60 confirmed SARS patients, of whom seven had died. The exposure by him
directly altered the government’s response to the illness. On 20 April, Deputy Health
Minister Gao Qiang said that Beijing had 346 patients with SARS, almost 10 times the
number the ministry had previously acknowledged just a few days before.
21. For that reason, when China’s Agriculture Ministry announced on 15 November 2005 that
it would vaccinate all of the country’s 5.2 billion chickens and other poultry in order to
guard against bird flu, various scientists held that China’s bird flu plan could trigger a
backfire on China. The effect of prophylactic use of antiviral drugs in the absence of a
human outbreak is still controversial. Substandard vaccines or an improper vaccinating
procedure could spread the virus easily. See French (2005) and McNeil (2005).
22. During the conference in Beijing, US$1.9 billion was pledged by 33 countries and
international institutions, of which $334 million was from the USA, $159 million from
Japan, and $120 million from the EU. China committed $10 million in total. China’s
financial contribution was criticized for being relatively little, especially in comparison
with the USA and Japan. Beijing officials have defended that as a developing country and
home to one third of the world’s population of birds, China needs to spend its money to
combat the disease at home. See Bradsher (2006) and People’s Daily Online (2006).
23. China blamed the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for causing a prolonged
delay in the delivery of the virus samples. Julie Hall of WHO’s Beijing Office, however,
disputed the Chinese account (Dow Jones International News 2006, Zhao 2006). One day
after Chan’s election, China sent 20 samples to a WHO collaborating laboratory in the
USA (Benitez et al. 2006).
24. Jiang Zuojun, Vice Health Minister, attributed the delay in identifying and confirming the
bird flu case to a lack of communication between researchers and health officials rather
than any deliberate cover-up. Until December 2004, China’s research institutes were not
required by law to report infectious diseases. Although this retrospective diagnosis has
caused concerns as to whether there might have been other unidentified human bird-flu
infections in China, the Chinese government refuses to re-examine other samples. Health
experts have suspected that the virus was present in China in 2003. Several members of a
Hong Kong family succumbed to the virus in Fujian in JanuaryFebruary 2003. An 8-
year-old girl died and was buried there before local doctors could identify the cause of her
death, and her 9-year-old brother and her father were diagnosed with bird flu on their
return to Hong Kong. Later her father died in Hong Kong. But Fujian officials insisted
that the family did not contract the virus in the province and that the girl died of































pneumonia. See Lee and Benitez (2003), Zheng and Hu (2003), China Daily (2006b),
Kwok (2006), Wall Street Journal Asia (2006).
25. Compliance studies have shown that an actor’s compliant behaviour could be motivated
by both utilitarian and non-utilitarian reasons. See Chayes and Chayes (1995) and Young
(1979).
26. The first application that China lodged to the Global fund was rejected in early 2002, due
to its unreliable statistics and closed attitude towards its HIV/AIDS problem. The
government submitted its application again later that year. See Rosenthal (2002).
27. In 2004 and 2005, China was granted by the Global Fund a total of US$56 million to
tackle HIV/AIDS. In July 2006, the Global Fund signed an agreement on grant of
US$12.5 million for HIV/AIDS work with China. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria, available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/programs/Port
folio.aspx?countryIDCHN&langen (accessed on 12 July 2006) and Dickie (2006a).
28. The ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action’ was adopted at the 4th World
Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.
29. The key advocate was Richard Holbrooke, the then US ambassador to the UN. He pushed
the Security Council to recognize the global HIV/AIDS threat after visiting Zambia in
December 1999. Having overcome the opposition from Russia and China, which
ultimately relented and did not take part in the debate, the USA followed through the
deliberation and led to the passage of the resolution. See UN Security Council, Resolution
1308 (2000), Sternberg (2002), and Prins (2004).
30. Wang Yizhou of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences argues that ‘low politics’ should enjoy the same degree of importance as
‘high politics’ in order for China to be able to handle non-traditional security issues
successfully (Wang 2006).
31. In terms of threat to security, SARS was equated with the September 11 terrorist attacks
on the USA (Zhang 2003).
32. Owing to China’s increased participation in global governance, and its growing self-
identity as a responsible great state after decades of rapid economic development, China’s
understanding of sovereignty has undergone a gradual evolution, shifting from a
traditional concept that proclaims the centrality of the principle of non-intervention in
internal affairs to one that embraces international cooperation and multilateralism in
treating non-traditional security issues. In this paper, we deal with the spread of infectious
diseases, which is regarded as one of non-traditional security threats. Despite the fact that
it is still wary about external interventions and the fact that its conceptualization of non-
traditional security threats is in large measure a state-centric concept, China has become
more flexible and willing to cooperate with various actors both inside and outside the
country. For a detailed account on the changing Chinese stances on sovereignty, see
Carlson (2005). Wang Yizhou has also suggested that it would be sensible to adopt a
flexible approach to understand sovereignty in the age of globalization, besides studying it
purely from the perspective of international law. Sovereignty, according to him, is more
than ever before bound to the obligation to protect human rights of the local populace.
Failure to respect, defend, and promote human rights within one’s territory would call
into question the very legitimacy of the state. See his (2000) Zhuquan fanwei zai sikao
[rethinking the scope of sovereignty], Ouzhou (Europe), 6, 411; and SARS yu fei
chuantong anquen [SARS and non-traditional security] at http://test.aiwep.org.cn/info/
content.asp? infold1981 Accessed 30 September 2007.
33. More than 60 Chinese NGOs accused the Chinese government of excluding them from
participation in the April 2006 election of representatives to the Chinese coordinating
board of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. The board is
responsible for distributing and overseeing grants worth more than US$300 million. See
Blanchard (2006b), Reuters News (2006), and Dickie (2006b).































34. Obviously, the younger generation of International Relations scholars in China show a
stronger interest in using Western theories to study global governance than their
predecessors. Su Changhe of Shanghai’s Fudan University, born in 1971, examines global
governance and international co-operation from the perspectives of global public issues,
global public goods, and international regimes. As far as the authors are concerned,
however, the discussion remains largely an introduction to the theories. See Su Changhe
(2000).
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